Nov. 17, 2026
The Supreme Law of the...States? SEC Proposes to Rescind Rule 14a-8 and Revise Rule 14a-4(c)
On September 16, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") proposed rescinding Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"). If adopted, state law and each company's governing documents, rather than federal rules, would decide whether shareholder proposals must be included in a company’s proxy materials. The SEC also proposed amending Rule 14a-4(c) so that companies could more freely use discretionary proxy voting authority on shareholder proposals that are not included in their proxy materials. In exchange, shareholders would get a check box to block that authority for their own shares. The proposal was published in the Federal Register on September 21, 2026, and comments are due by November 20, 2026.
The SEC's central argument for the rescission is that Section 14(a) allows the Commission to regulate and facilitate the proxy process but does not allow it to govern the substance of shareholder voting rights. The SEC views the Rule 14a-4(c) amendments as aligned with the rescission, but also as independently justified even if the rescission is not adopted. The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 is the natural progression of the SEC’s recent treatment of shareholder proposals. During the 2026 proxy season, the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance (“CorpFin”) announced that it would not respond to no-action requests (with the exception of those relating to claims to exclude under Rule 14a-8(i)(1) (not proper matter for shareholders under state law). No such requests having been made during the 2026 proxy season, before making the proposal to rescind the rule, CorpFin announced that in the future it did not intend to respond to any no-action requests – even those under Rule 14a-8(i)(1). In other words, as a practical matter, questions regarding the appearance of shareholder proposals in management’s proxy materials already had been relegated to state law and the companies’ governing documents.
Background
Rule 14a-8
Corporations are creatures of state law, and the conduct of shareholder meetings, including the presentation of shareholder proposals in a company’s proxy statement, falls squarely within state authority. As corporations grew and their shareholders became geographically dispersed, proxy voting replaced in-person voting. Abuse followed, as proxies were often solicited without telling shareholders what they were voting on. Congress responded by enacting Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act which, according to the accompanying House Report, gave the SEC power to "control the conditions under which proxies may be solicited." Section 14(a) granted plenary authority, providing that “It shall be unlawful for any person, . . . in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 12 of [the Exchange Act].
Relying on that authority, the SEC adopted Rule 14a-8's predecessor in 1942. According to the SEC, its intent was to facilitate rights shareholders already held under state law—specifically, the presentation of and voting on proposals—rather than to create new ones. The rule required inclusion in management’s proxy statement of any proposal that was a "proper subject for action by the security holders." At the time, Rule 14a-8’s predecessor rule rested on Chairman Ganson Purcell's predictions that its costs would be small, proposals would be few, and state law would make clear what shareholders could present.
But those predictions did not come to pass. This was first seen in a 1945 SEC release containing a letter from the Director of CorpFin, which stated that state law governed what counted as a "proper subject," yet also treated "general political, social or economic" proposals as improper without referencing any state's law. In the SEC's view, the letter effectively positioned the rule as federal common law, and many observers have since expressed the view that the rule evolved to function as such. The SEC subsequently layered on new grounds for exclusions: personal grievances and low-vote resubmissions in 1947 and 1948, social causes in 1952, and "ordinary business" in 1954. Today’s modern structure, which was established in 1976, includes thirteen substantive exclusions, along with a presumption that non-binding proposals are proper. Along the way, the rule grew from roughly 200 words to more than 3,000. The SEC now argues that this evolution departs from the rule's original purpose, exceeds its Section 14(a) authority, and impermissibly displaces state law.
Rule 14a-4(c)
Rule 14a-4(c) addresses a related question: when a proxy card returned by a shareholder lets the proxy holder vote, at its discretion, on matters not printed on the card. This process is notable because shareholders who do not use Rule 14a-8 can instead run an independent proxy solicitation at their own expense. Rule 14a-4(c) decides whether the company may still vote the proxies it receives on a proposal it leaves off its own card. Under the current framework, adopted in 1998, a company loses that authority if the proponent solicits holders of enough shares to carry the proposal. The company is then left with a binary choice: include the proposal at its own expense or omit it and forgo any votes on it through its own card. The SEC says this pressure has intensified since the 2021 universal proxy rules made "zero slate" campaigns possible. The SEC has noted that in every such campaign the SEC staff has observed, the company ended up including the proponent's proposals.
The SEC’s Proposals
If adopted, the proposal would remove the federal requirement that companies include shareholder proposals in management’s proxy materials. Whether a proposal must be included would turn on State law or, when State law permits, a company's charter and bylaws. The rescission of Rule 14a-8 would affect all companies, including registered funds and business development companies, although fund shareholders would keep their statutory voting rights under the Investment Company Act. Separately, amending Rule 14a-4(c) would allow a company to exercise discretionary authority over timely shareholder proposals regardless of how widely the proponent solicits. The company would need to (i) briefly describe the proposal and state how it intends to vote, (ii) cross-reference that disclosure on the proxy card, and (iii) include a check box that shareholders can mark to block discretionary voting of their shares. These requirements apply only to timely proposals.
Under the SEC’s proposed Rule 14a-4(c) amendment, which the SEC states stands separately on its own merits, whether a shareholder proposal is “timely” could generally be determined by the advance notice deadlines set forth in a company’s charter or bylaws. If neither state law nor the company’s governing documents provided for such a deadline, the default rule would apply: to be timely, a proposal would have to be received by the company at least 45 days before the anniversary of the mailing date of the company’s prior-year proxy materials. If the company does not receive notice by the applicable deadline, it may exercise discretionary authority with only a specific statement in the proxy statement to that effect – no description of or cross-reference to the proposal would be required and the proxy card would require no specific check box. The SEC indicates the proposed changes are complementary to the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8, indicating that, without the Rule 14a-4(c) amendment, independent solicitations could still effectively force proposals onto the company's proxy card.
Key Takeaways
The SEC itself acknowledges that the proposals are not so easily one-sided. It recognizes that the changes could disproportionately affect less well-resourced proponents, such as retail investors and smaller advocacy groups, for whom independent solicitation may be too expensive. It also anticipates a transition period that could last several years, with legal uncertainty and litigation while states and companies develop new frameworks. With the recent exception of Texas, no state has legislated on shareholder proposals in more than 80 years. However, by removing the federal rule, the SEC expects the proposal will make such state legislation more of a matter of when rather than if.
In light of this uncertainty, companies should review their governing documents as well as any controlling provisions of state law to ensure that, if the proposed amendments are adopted, they will be prepared, to provide the required disclosure and check box language necessary to exercise discretionary voting authority with respect to any timely proposals that might be received. Specifically, companies should confirm that their advance notice bylaws explicitly govern shareholder business proposals presented at meetings and establish clear deadlines and targeted informational requirements. Companies also should consider (or reconsider) whether, and on what terms, their governing documents should provide shareholders access to management’s proxy statement for shareholder proposals. A company’s advance notice deadline would also determine whether a proposal advanced through an independent solicitation is timely. Companies and their counsel, however, should be cautious about being too “aggressive” in formulating the requirements of their advance notice bylaws – one Delaware court, for example, struck down a facially valid advance notice bylaw provision due to its incomprehensible nature. The Kellner [1] decision also pointed out that “as applied” challenges to advance notice bylaw provision could be successful if they are adopted, amended or enforced during a threatened or actual proxy contest.
We obviously are headed into some uncharted waters regarding shareholder proposals – both as to the ability to exclude such proposals from being considered at a meeting and inclusion of such materials in management’s proxy materials. Companies should prepare for how they will respond; however, some uncertainty will continue for the foreseeable future. As noted in the Federal Register release, interested parties may submit comments through November 20, 2026.
[1] Kellner v. AIM ImmunoTech Inc. 320 A3d 239 (Del. 2024).
