In Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment, No. 24-171, 2026 WL 815823 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2026), the U.S. Supreme Court narrowed the circumstances in which a company may be held contributorily liable for copyright infringement committed by its users. Cox, a major internet service provider, received more than 160,000 infringement notices identifying subscriber accounts engaged in copyright infringement. The copyright owners, including Sony, sued Cox, rather than the individual infringers, arguing that Cox became responsible by continuing to provide service to the infringers. At trial, the jury agreed with the copyright owners and awarded statutory damages. The Fourth Circuit affirmed contributory liability under a knowledge-based theory. The Supreme Court reversed and held that a provider is contributorily liable only if it intended its service to be used for infringement, which may be proven only by showing either (1) affirmative inducement or (2) that the provider offers a service tailored to infringement.

Path 1: Affirmative Inducement (Active Encouragement)

The Supreme Court found that the first path, “inducement,” requires more than providing a tool capable of misuse. It requires specific acts that actively encourage infringement. The Court pointed to classic examples where companies promoted or marketed a product as a way to copy copyrighted works, like the conduct the Court previously found actionable in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).

Path 2: A Service “Tailored to Infringement”

The second path focuses on the design of the service itself. A service is "tailored to infringement" when it is not capable of substantial or commercially significant non-infringing uses. The Court linked this principle to Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) where it was held that selling a product with lawful uses does not create contributory liability merely because some use the product for infringement. Accordingly, if a service has substantial legitimate uses, it generally will not be treated as built for piracy.

Here, the Court takes a narrow view of secondary liability under the Copyright Act and rejects the Fourth Circuit’s rule that knowledge plus continued service is enough.  Instead, the Court emphasized that contributory liability turns on intent, and that intent may be shown only in the two circumstances described above.  Mere knowledge, even when coupled with inadequate policing, does not suffice. 

The Court summarized its rule as follows:

“The provider of a service is contributorily liable for the user’s infringement only if it intended that the provided service be used for infringement.”

This interpretation effectively insulates a service provider from secondary liability unless a plaintiff can prove intent, closing the path to previously applied knowledge-based theories.  The concurrence disagreed that secondary liability be limited to only these two circumstances arguing Sony and Grokster left open other common-law theories.

Conclusion

Applying this new rule, the Court found Cox was not contributorily liable because Cox did not affirmatively induce infringement and because internet access has extensive lawful uses. The Court also emphasized that knowledge of infringement and insufficient preventative action do not establish intent. Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) safe harbor provisions support broader liability, explaining that the DMCA creates defenses and does not expand secondary liability.